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Abstract: Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-
control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the 
skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control 
remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful 
agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-
grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to 
select, revise and correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows 
conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, 
and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and 
monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able 
do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that 
incorporates non-propositional representations (including feedback signals about strategy 
implementation, such as the feeling of mental effort) into the formation and revision of the 
mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on 
implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the 
theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the 
contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, 
expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary 
motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert someone is at self-control, 
the less likely they are to use it. 




Tom and his partner have recently committed to saving all the money they can to buy a house. 
While doing groceries, Tom accidentally stumbles upon the wine section. His eyes drift 
toward a rare Burgundy bottle, and he discovers that it’s on sale today. Noticing a growing 
desire to buy the bottle, to protect his commitment to save from being overpowered, he tries 
to imagine the feeling of opening the door to his new home. But this Pinot Noir’s immediate 
allure is too strong, and the motivational conflict inside Tom intensifies. So he tries to distract 
himself from the bottle by turning away from it and looking at the unchecked items in his 
shopping list. But he finds himself surrounded by wine, which does not help. In a last attempt, 
Tom calls his husband Tim and tells him about his dilemma. Tim sternly reminds Tom they 
have enough wine at home, so he should leave that and go back to his chore at once. That 
does the trick for him. 
 This story illustrates a fact about self-control often unacknowledged in philosophical 
discussion: agents can actively select, revise, and correct the self-control strategies they deploy 
while self-control exertion unfolds. Dozens of possible strategies exist to tackle motivational 
conflicts, from selecting which situations we enter and restructuring our environments, to 
reconceptualizing stimuli and forcing ourselves to inhibit a behavioral tendency (Naragon-
Gainey et al., 2017)⁠; and evidence shows people often use multiple strategies in a single self-
control episode (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013; Ford et al., 2019)⁠. That we try actively to 
select and manage self-control strategies is also revealed by the flowing stream of popular 
books offering tips and tricks to improve willpower, overcome procrastination, and break bad 
habits.1 Additionally, programs and groups tackling addiction are a constant staple of 
psychological research and practice; and countless online services and apps promise to help 
you manage attention, generate and sustain good habits, and advance along the path of self-
improvement. 
 Selecting and managing self-control strategies is a tricky endeavor. While some 
strategies may be generally more effective than others (Aldao et al., 2010; Duckworth et al., 
2016)⁠, a strategy’s success depends significantly on the particular context and the agent’s 
 
1 Recent notable exemplars include K. McGonigal’s The willpower instinct (Penguin, 2011); B. Tracy’s 
No excuses!: The power of self-discipline (2010, Vanguard); A. Johnson’s The little book of big change: The 
no-willpower approach to breaking any habit (2016, New Harbinger); and R. Baumeister and J. Tierney’s 
Willpower: Rediscovering the greatest human strength (Penguin, 2012). 
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abilities (Bonanno & Burton, 2013)⁠, so appropriately managing self-control strategies requires 
a great deal of skill. Agents must be able to determine which among multiple strategies best 
fits the current context; whether the strategy implementation is working or not; and either 
maintain or revise the strategy as needed. It thus seems right to recognize, as theorists often 
have, that successful self-control exertion requires skill (Levy, 2017; Mele, 1987)⁠, and that self-
control is itself a complex skill (Holton, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999)⁠. 
 And yet, no complete account has been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-
control exertion possible.2 Such an account must solve the guidance problem: how can agents 
transform their abstract and coarse-grained commitments into the highly context-sensitive, 
fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and correct strategies during self-
control exertion? As I will show, existing explanations identify the agent’s involvement with 
deliberation and commitment formation processes that occur prior to self-control exertion 
(e.g. Tom’s deciding he will save to buy a house), but do not yet account for the crucial jobs the 
agent must while exerting self-control: selecting an appropriate strategy, specifying its 
implementation parameters, monitoring its success, and maintaining or modifying it as 
appropriate. Current theories have not said enough to explain how agents can control self-
control exertion as it unfolds. 
 Here I develop the skill model of self-control employing recent conceptual developments 
from the literature on motor skills. Section 1 presents the guidance problem and explains why 
it has not yet been solved. Section 2 introduces hierarchical models of skillful motor agency, 
and section 3 builds a skill model that presents self-control exertion as a skillful action and is 
capable of solving the guidance problem. Section 4 unpacks some of the skill model’s 
implications for the philosophy of self-control. 
 This discussion focuses on synchronic self-control: the ability to overcome a temptation 
that is currently active and motivationally stronger than the commitment it opposes.3 This is 
 
2 Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2020) take a notable step in this direction, albeit their focus (diachronic 
self-control) is different from this work’s (synchronic self-control). For discussion see §4.1. 
3 The relevant temptations and commitments are usually ‘proximal’ temptations and commitments, i.e. 
they are about what the agent is to do now (as opposed to some other future time) (Kennett & Smith, 
1996; Mele, 1987, ch. 5, 2003 ch. 8; Sripada, 2014). 
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distinct from other possible forms of self-control, particularly diachronic self-control: the 
ability to overcome foreseeably, but not currently, dominant temptations. Accordingly, ‘self-
control’ will henceforth refer to synchronic self-control unless otherwise noted. That said, one 
of this account’s upshots is clarifying the relationship between synchronic and diachronic self-
control. Specifically, I will argue that synchronic self-control has explanatory primacy, but 
diachronic self-control has practical prevalence: the former makes the latter’s development 
possible, but the latter is used more frequently by skilled agents. This leads to the surprising 
conclusion that synchronic self-control is self-effacing: the more skilled at it you are, the less 
you tend to use it. 
 
1. The guidance problem 
1.1. The skillful agency requirement 
The view that self-control exertions are something we intentionally do, not merely something 
that happens to us, is widely shared (Holton, 2009; Mele, 1998; Sripada, 2014; but see 
Kennett & Smith 1996)⁠. Everyday responsibility attribution practices also presuppose this: if 
we are to consider people praiseworthy or blameworthy for exerting self-control or failing to 
do so, we must assume that exercising self-control is in some significant sense under their 
control and up to them.4 Intuitively, self-control is something we intentionally do: a process 
we exert to transform our commitments into action despite the motivational obstacles we find 
along the way, and to protect our coherence as planning agents acting through time. 
 A consensus is also growing among philosophers and scientists that rather than a 
resource (like energy or glucose) or a capacity (like working memory), self-control is rather a 
skill (Inzlicht et al., 2020; Levy, 2017; Mischel, 2014; Moffitt et al., 2011; Tabibnia et al., 
2011)⁠. Mele holds self-control is not “a mental analog of brute physical strength” since, unlike 
resources or mere capacities, its acquisition requires a gradual learning process that leads to 
 
4 This leads back at least to Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics II). One could reply that we also sometimes 
praise and blame people for things that are not actions, like desires or character traits. However, 
arguably the non-actional things we hold ourselves responsible for are to some extent under our 
control, were originated by things that were under our control, or are displays of things under our 
control. 
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developing “a variety of skills—and considerable savvy about which skills to use in particular 
situations” (2011, pp. 468–469)⁠. Additionally, self-control exertion often spans “across 
multiple psychological domains, i.e., action selection, attention, belief, evaluation, memory, 
and thought” and “requires performing the right cognitive control actions at the right time 
with the right intensity for the right duration” (Sripada, 2020). Thus guiding self-control 
exertion is not simply a matter psychological capacity, but rather a matter of coordinating 
capacities to solve a self-control problem. Such complex, multi-track ability belongs in the 
category of skills, rather than that of uni-dimensional resources or capacities. 
 I take it as a starting point, then, that a theory of self-control must satisfy the skillful 
agency requirement: it must explain how self-control exertions can be intentional actions in the 
particular ways in which skillful actions are.5 This is challenging because it requires solving the 
guidance problem. 
1.2. Guidance 
Self-control is required when an agent undergoes a motivational conflict, i.e. a conflict 
between a commitment (e.g. an intention or a judgment about what is all-things-considered 
best to do) and a temptation, i.e. a commitment-discordant motivational state (this could be a 
desire, a craving, an emotion, or an urge).6 Motivational conflicts usually admit of a broad 
range of solutions. Consider Walter Mischel’s work on delay of gratification, where four- and 
five-year-old children were placed in front of a yummy treat (often a marshmallow) and told 
they could either eat the one treat or wait until the experimenter returned (usually 10-15 
minutes) and get two treats instead. Successful children used multiple distinct strategies: 
 
some put their hands over their eyes, rested their heads on their arms, and invented 
other similar techniques for averting their gaze most of the time, occasionally seeming 
to remind themselves with a quick glance. Some talked quietly to themselves or even 
sang (‘This is such a pretty day, hooray’); others made faces, picked their noses, made up 
 
5 In saying this I am not committed to the stronger claim that all instances of self-control exertion are 
instances of skillful action. E.g. self-control could sometimes be a matter of “brute force” resistance 
(Mele, 1987) ⁠. 
6 Self-control could also be needed to tackle commitment-discordant habits (Silver, 2019). I leave that 
possibility aside here and focus solely on self-control in commitment/temptation conflicts. 
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games with their hands and feet, and even tried to doze off while continuing to wait. 
One of the most successful ‘delayers’ actually managed to nap during the delay time 
(Mischel, 1996, p. 202) ⁠. 
 
Different strategies had strikingly different results (Mischel et al., 1989). If instructed to think 
“fun thoughts”, children waited twice as long as those told to focus on the reward they would 
get. Children told to focus on how the marshmallow looked like a fluffy cloud waited on 
average almost three times more than those told to focus on the marshmallow’s chewy 
sweetness (13 minutes vs. less than 5 minutes). And those told to imagine the marshmallow as 
a picture of a marshmallow waited for an average 17 minutes. The striking influence of verbal 
instructions on performance shows that intentional strategy selection affects self-control 
effectiveness. This illustrates that there are several crucial jobs for the agent to do as the self-
control episode unfolds: specify how the commitment is to be implemented, monitor the 
implementation’s success, and solve problems that arise during implementation. In a word, 
after the commitment is formed and self-control exertion is initiated, the agent needs to guide 
self-control exertion as it unfolds. 
 How is such guidance to be explained? So far, attempts to tackle this question have 
appealed to a series of information-accumulation mechanisms used in cognitive science to 
explain decision-making. Consider Chandra Sripada’s (2020) ‘divided mind’7 theory, which 
holds that self-control exertion is constituted by a series of skillfully orchestrated cognitive 
control processes aimed at overcoming commitment-discordant automatic response 
tendencies. Cognitive control is the set of higher-order cognitive functions dedicated to 
producing goal-directed behavior, particularly when this requires overcoming competing 
response tendencies. It has three key functions (Shenhav et al., 2013). First, monitoring for 
 
7 Arguably a part of the Western-philosophical discussion since Plato and Aristotle’s divisions between 
the soul’s passionate and rational elements in the Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics, divided-mind 
accounts have recently enjoyed a notorious resurgence inspired by dual-process models in cognitive 
science (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) ⁠. Contemporary versions include Haas (2018) ⁠, Heatherton & 
Wagner (2011); Hofmann et al. (2009); Holton (2009) ⁠, Levy (2011, 2017) and Sripada (2014) ⁠. For 
critical discussion see Mele (2014). While a connection between cognitive control and self-control is 
often simply assumed (Inzlicht et al., 2020) ⁠, Sripada (2020) develops a detailed theory that bridges the 
two concepts. 
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conflict signals that occur when the agent is performing some goal-directed behavior (e.g. 
performance delays or a mismatch between goal-state representation and perceptual outcome). 
Second, selecting a control strategy, i.e. selecting which regulatory processes must be 
implemented to solve the conflict. Third, implementing the control strategy through regulatory 
mechanisms like inhibitory control and working memory. Applying this to self-control, 
Sripada argues that agents solve motivational conflicts by deploying their cognitive control 
resources: if sufficiently salient, the conflict between temptation and commitment is detected 
by cognitive control’s monitoring systems; cognitive control then selects a control strategy to 
overcome the temptation in favor of the agent’s commitment, and recruits regulatory resources 
to implement the selected strategy.8 
 To account for guidance, Sripada refers to cognitive control’s selection mechanism. 
This mechanism subpersonally performs cost-benefit calculations to estimate the “expected 
value of control” [EVC] for each available strategy and selects the expected-value-maximizing 
one. Sripada argues that this and other such processes generate exercises of self-control by 
forming “executive decisions”: subpersonal processes that integrate and accumulate 
information in favor of selecting a control strategy until it reaches a critical threshold, at 
which point a decision is made whether to implement the strategy or not. These are, of course, 
not decisions in the traditional sense—they involve no conscious weighting of reasons. Such 
‘bounded accumulation’ or ‘sequential sampling’ models (Forstmann et al., 2016)⁠, used to 
model fast decision-making processes, portray processes that occur subpersonally, just like 
EVC calculations. Even if the decision itself can become accessible at the personal level once 
it is produced, the decision-making (i.e. the information-accumulation and assessment) 
processes remain subpersonal.9 
 While these information-aggregation mechanisms must certainly play a crucial role 
(see §3.1 below), crucial elements of the story are still missing. If decision-making occurs 
 
8 This is a simplification of Sripada’s view, according to which cognitive control can tackle only 
millisecond-fast “response pulses”, whereas temptations are identifiable with the more persistent 
“emotion-type states” that originate such pulses. Only response pulses can be directly controlled, so 
exerting self-control over the temptation requires skillfully deploying cognitive control against the 
myriad response pulses it produces. 
9 Sequential-sampling models are also used by others to account for self-control (Ainslie, 2020; 
Berkman et al., 2017). Here too the decision-making process remains subpersonal. 
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largely at the subpersonal level (the level of neural sub-systems independent of the agent’s 
experience), this raises the concern that, by appealing to these processes to account for agency, 
we lose sight of what we wanted to explain. After all, as Adina Roskies (2018)⁠ argues, 
 
if decision-making is merely a competition between incoming sensory 
information in favor of one of two options, decisions can be reached without 
control, without awareness, and perhaps even without the operation of mind 
entirely. Self-governance seems out of the question: There is no “self ” to do the 
self-governing, or to establish self-control (p. 248). 
 
In response it can be argued that these information-accumulation processes are agential in an 
important deliberative sense. After all, they are triggered by a conflict between a motivational 
state and the agent’s commitment, and their goal is identifying the value-maximizing strategy 
to protect the agent’s commitment. Thus, insofar as they are sensitive to the agent’s 
commitment, they are sensitive to the process of practical reasoning that originated it. 
Arguably, then, these processes are agentive, even if subpersonal, since they are reasons-
responsive. 
 Even granting this, the story so far remains crucially incomplete. A theory of agency 
needs to explain not only the action’s relationship to the agent’s reasons, but also the agent’s 
relationship to her action as it unfolds (Frankfurt, 1978)⁠. It should explain not only how 
actions are reasons-responsive, but also how agents are able to shape them as they occur. And 
this requires a story of personal-level guidance. Lacking this, agency in self-control would be 
analogous to driving a fully autonomous car: we tell it where we want to go, we press the 
button, and the car runs its mechanisms to yield a result that matches our goal; but we are not 
in control of its speed or the force with which it stops, whether it stops at the intersections, or 
how it handles pedestrian interactions; we exert no control over whether the car’s mechanisms 
succeed or fail, despite having played an  agentive role in triggering them and setting their 
target. 
 Thus, with respect to self-control the guidance problem remains unsolved: how can 
agents structure and manage the cognitive processes that constitute self-control exertions as 
these processes unfold? Successfully solving this problem will require not only providing a 
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personal-level story of agentive control during self-control exertion, but also explaining how 
the personal-level processes that feature in this story interact with subpersonal processes of the 
kind that compose information-aggregation mechanisms like EVC and others. 
 We have a clue about where to look for solutions to the guidance problem: if self-
control is a skill, the guidance account should be similar to that used to explain other skillful 
actions. Motor skill researchers have recently been tackling the issue of how personal and 
subpersonal processes interact in action control to enable agentive guidance. The next section 
will introduce tools developed to explain guidance of motor action, which sections 3-4 will 
apply to self-control. 
 
2. Skillful guidance in motor action 
The study of skillful motor action involves the challenge of explaining how agentive 
performance can be structured by both the agent’s intentions (which specify the outcome to be 
achieved in a propositional format apt for deliberation and planning) and motor 
representations (which represent action-relevant attributes of objects and situations in a 
format that is constrained by the biomechanical features of the agent’s body, suitable for 
guiding action execution). This is challenging since intentions and motor representations have 
different representational formats: the former abstract and propositional, the latter fine-
grained and non-propositional. The challenge is explaining how these two representation 
types interact in order to jointly and non-accidentally produce coherent goal-directed 
behavior.10 Attempts to face this challenge have relied on a well-confirmed ‘hierarchical 
framework’ of the psychological architecture of agentive control. In this section I briefly 
sketch a specific version of the hierarchical framework, which makes it possible to identify 
 
10 This is the so-called “interface problem” (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014) ⁠. (For discussion see Brozzo, 
2017; Fridland, 2019; Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2017; Shepherd, 2017.) The interface problem and the 
guidance problem share a common general concern: defining how explicit and implicit processes work 
together to coordinate action. If it is agreed that commitments are propositionally formatted while the 
processes constituting EVC calculations have a non-propositional, reinforcement-based associative 
format, then the guidance problem in self-control would constitute a version of the interface problem. 
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different levels of control and interactions between them.11 
 According to the hierarchical framework, action control works via a series of coordinated, 
hierarchically-arranged processing levels. Higher-level control processes manipulate more abstract, 
coarser-grained representations, and lower-level processes manipulate more specific, finer-grained 
representations. Higher-level processes influence and coordinate multiple lower-level processes, 
while lower-level processes somewhat autonomously ‘fill in the details’ of implementation left 
unspecified by higher-order ones (Pacherie, 2008). (We will see, however, that influence also 
flows from the bottom up.) 
 According to ‘mixed-formats’ versions of the hierarchical model (Fridland, 2019; 
Shepherd, 2017, 2018)⁠, some intentions can carry contents with more than one format. Such 
mixed-format intentions connect higher-level, purely propositional intentions and lower-level, 
purely motor representations.12 At the higher level, general intentions propositionally represent 
the agent’s global plans and goals, while intermediate-level mixed-format intentions specify the 
steps and strategies selected to achieve the goal represented in the general intention, in a 
format capable of influencing lower-level sensory and motor processes. Performance can 
involve multiple layers of general and mixed-format intentions, each one refining the 
representational grain of the one above, further specifying the action’s implementation 
details.13 
 Processes of practical reasoning which are the traditional focus of philosophers are too 
 
11 To be clear, nothing here hinges on this specific framework being correct for motor action. I 
introduce it because its conceptual structure will be helpful to solving the guidance problem for self-
control in §3. 
12 For other models see Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2014) and Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2017). I leave the 
debates surrounding these proposals aside (referring the interested reader to the review in Mylopoulos 
& Pacherie, 2019) and focus on mixed-formats models because they rely on the claim that motor 
representations, although non-propositional in format, are however conceptual in content ⁠, and are thus 
subject to rationality constraints and capable of entering into practical reasoning processes. This will be 
useful when returning to self-control. 
13 The distinction between general and mixed-format intentions closely follows Fridland’s (2019) ⁠ 
general-intention / practical-intention distinction. Notice this is not a temporal distinction (unlike e.g. 
Bratman’s (1987) future-directed vs. present-directed intentions): general and mixed-format intentions 
coexist during action performance, simultaneously structuring it at different levels. 
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slow for skilled action time frames, and manipulate mainly propositional content which is too 
abstract and rough-grained to productively interact with motor representations. Thus, while 
they can adequately produce general intentions, they are not suitable to forming mixed-format 
intentions. These require flexible practical reasoning, a type of deliberation that can integrate 
both propositionally- and nonpropositionally-formatted representations (e.g. sensory, motor, 
imagistic, affective...) employing non-deductive processes (like association or imagistic 
rehearsal) that aim at the formation of a mixed-format intention. Flexible practical reasoning 
takes an already-formed general intention as its starting point, and aims at forming a mixed-
format intention that further specifies the means by which the general intention can be 
implemented.14 Both propositional and flexible practical reasoning processes count as practical 
reasoning in the sense that they are conscious, deliberative processes whereby the agent aims at 
reaching a conclusion about what to do. 
 Consider the task of deciding where in an empty room a sofa should be. Instead of 
measuring the dimensions of the sofa, the room and the other objects, and then calculating an 
adequate location, as you look at the room you can overlay a mental image of the sofa onto 
different spots and select the one that seems to work best. We often use such blends of mental 
imagery and perception (what Briscoe (2018)⁠ calls “make-perceive”) in everyday practical 
reasoning (Shepherd, 2018)⁠. Through these flexible (i.e. quick, context-sensitive and reasons-
responsive) deliberative processes, agents can form and manage mixed-format intentions more 
efficiently than via traditional deliberation, while the process still respects rationality 
constraints like consistency with beliefs and desires, and means-end coherence⁠. In the case of 
skill, flexible practical reasoning is bolstered by well-practiced perceptual, attentional, and 
conceptual routines that enable skilled agents to intuitively grasp relevant aspects of the 
situation and assess different opportunities for action.  
 To illustrate, take the skill of driving.15 When a skilled driver S navigates through 
moving traffic, pedestrians and climate conditions to reach her destination, we can distinguish 
 
14 Flexible practical reasoning can also take a mixed-format intention as starting point, and seek to 
form a more specific mixed-format intention. For simplicity, I focus on the case of general intentions 
as starting points. 
15 This example and Fig.1 are adapted from Christensen et al. (2016) ⁠. 
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four different levels of control at play (Fig.1).16 At the most abstract level, S has a general 
intention representing her goal (e.g. arriving at a given destination), often formed via 
propositional practical reasoning. This general intention then informs her lower-level flexible 
practical reasoning, whereby S uses variously-formatted representations (propositional, sensory, 
imagistic, perceptual, etc.) to select appropriate context-sensitive ways to reach her goal. S 
thereby selects proximal control strategies (accelerating to reach highway traffic speed; shifting 
lanes towards the exit; etc.) whose mixed-format representation constitutes her mixed-format 
intention’s content. Both types of practical reasoning are forms of agentive control: reasons-
responsive, personal-level processes whereby the agent intentionally structures her behavior in 
light of her reasons for action. 
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical control structures in skilled bodily action (based on Christensen et al., 
2016)⁠. 
 
 Further down the hierarchy, automatic control processes implement the multiple 
sensorimotor routines that constitute skillful performance, while monitoring and adjusting 
performance as it unfolds. Implementation processes deploy fine-grained procedures that have 
been sufficiently trained to incorporate the reasons-responsiveness acquired through practice, 
and sufficiently over-practiced to become largely automatic (e.g. steering, accelerating, 
 
16 These four levels can be subdivided into multiple sub-levels within the four categories. 
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changing gears, using the breaks, and so on). Monitoring processes transmit error signals in 
the implementation process (e.g. mismatches between expected outcome and sensory 
feedback, or performance delays). 
 The frontier between agentive and automatic control shifts as agents gain experience, 
with more expert agents having richer automatic routines and exerting practical reasoning at 
higher levels. Additionally, a process that is usually automatic can become deliberate, e.g. if S 
decides to deliberately practice in order to improve technique. Thus, not all instances of 
driving involve agentive control to the same degree. Easy drives rely mostly on well-practiced, 
automatic routines; though arguably some minimal degree of agentive control is still involved, 
e.g. to remain vigilant of unforeseen obstacles. But harder drives (e.g. driving in a new city 
through heavy rain) will require engaging in much more constant and complex flexible 
practical deliberation. 
 Crucially, influence also flows from the bottom up. Subpersonal monitoring systems, 
trained through repeated practice, continually assess how the implementation is going and 
output error signals. Many of these signals are used by automatic control to adjust 
implementation parameters autonomously, but some of them also manifest in S’s experience 
as e.g. feelings of fluidity, surprise, error or effort. Call these action-oriented feelings: conscious, 
affect-involving representations produced by subpersonal information-accumulation 
processes, which provide the agent with information about how implementation is going, in 
non-propositional formats that she can quickly incorporate into flexible practical reasoning at 
the personal level. By allowing agents to make quick, informed decisions about whether to 
maintain or modify mixed-format intentions mid-performance (e.g. the feeling that the 
steering wheel is not responding as expected might lead the driver to stop and check for 
mechanical problems), action-oriented feelings and flexible practical reasoning are part of the 
machinery that makes it possible for agents to guide action as it unfolds. Thus, the output of 
subpersonal monitoring processes, in the form of action-oriented feelings, can itself become 
input for new rounds of personal-level practical reasoning which adjust or revise the mixed-
format intentions at play, in a feedback loop that steers performance as it happens. 
 Before moving on, it is important to tackle one question. I mentioned that both 
propositional and flexible practical reasoning are reasons-responsive; but how is the latter 
reasons-responsive? This is a particularly challenging issue given that the multiplicity of 
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representational formats involved requires some sort of unification.17 A full response is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but let me quickly sketch three elements toward an answer.  
 I begin by suggesting that, for any sufficiently complex action A, forming a general 
intention to perform it raises for the agent an implementation question that can be formulated 
as ‘How will I A?’. It need not be explicitly or linguistically articulated, but finding an answer 
to this question is necessary for implementing the action, and the question itself can be seen 
as establishing a domain of congruent answers, i.e. specifications of possible steps I can take to 
try to reach the goal represented in my intention. Flexible practical reasoning is just the 
cognitive process of attentively seeking a congruent answer to the implementation question.18 
In seeking answers to this question, the agent’s attentional focus shifts between multiple 
representations (perceptual, motor, mnemonic, imagistic…) as she looks for contributions to 
building an appropriate answer. Through flexible practical reasoning, the agent threads several 
of these diverse representations together to form a congruent answer to the question posed by 
the agent’s general intention. This attentive search on the part of the agent explains how 
diverse representations can be unified to constitute the content of mixed-format intentions, 
which specify congruent answers to the implementation question. The more skilled the agent 
is, the more accurately she will be able to distinguish congruent from incongruent answers, 
relevant from irrelevant representations. This sets constraints on which representations are 
selected and which mixed-format intentions are formed as a result.  
 This attentive search is one component of the explanation of of flexible practical 
reasoning’s reasons-responsiveness. A second component is the representations and 
metacognitive signals that skilled agents have developed through their history of deliberate 
practice. Through practice, agents form what Pacherie and Mylopoulos (2020) call “structured 
action representations”, which bring together nodes of chunked motor schemas (mappings of 
sensory inputs and parameter values onto motor outcomes) in a way that is responsive to the 
action domain’s structure. Since they crystallize the structural features of the action domain, 
skilled agents can use such representations to efficiently tackle familiar situations. 
Representations like these make flexible practical reasoning sensitive to reasons without the 
need to explicitly represent such reasons in a propositional format at the time of action. By 
 
17 I thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to the need to tackle these questions. 
18 This way of framing flexible practical reasoning borrows from Koralus’ (2014) erotetic theory of 
attention. On the link between skillful action and answering ‘How to?’ questions, see Douskos (2019). 
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including representations like these as part of their content, mixed-format representations can 
structure lower-level perceptual and motor routines in accordance with the action domain. 
 Finally, when multiple possible answers to the same implementation question emerge, 
flexible practical reasoning is also in charge of selecting one among them which seems most 
promising for the current action situation. To do this, the skilled agent can rely on action-
oriented feelings (e.g. feelings of fluency, of risk, and of effort) to compare the candidate 
answers and select the one that seems most promising. As mentioned above, the skilled 
agent’s practice history fine-tunes these metacognitive processes, making them both sensitive 
to the expected costs and benefits of each available strategy, and capable of signaling when a 
change of strategy is needed mid-performance. This aspect of the process further accounts for 
its reasons-responsiveness, and will become crucial to the discussion of self-control skill 
below. 
 I leave further questions about the hierarchical framework and flexible practical 
reasoning for another occasion. My goal here is showing that we can illuminate agentive 
guidance in self-control through the hierarchical framework. 
 
3. The skill of self-control 
To build a hierarchical model of self-control guidance, I begin from the bottom up, by 
characterizing (3.1) the feeling of mental effort as an action-oriented feeling. I then explain 
how (3.2) skilled agents can use flexible practical reasoning to identify and generate effective 
regulatory strategies in a given motivational-conflict situation. If this is correct, a crucial 
prediction is that the way agents form mixed-format intentions has an influence on how 
successful they are at exerting self-control. I present (3.3) evidence that corroborates this 
prediction. 
 
3.1. The feeling of mental effort 
Recall that part of what makes the guidance problem pressing for self-control is the wide 
range of self-control strategies available to agents: how do agents skillfully manage strategy 
selection and implementation? To answer, theorists have appealed to cognitive control’s 
selection function, positing a reinforcement-learning system that seeks to maximize long-term 
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reward by identifying the control strategy that the agent’s past type-similar experiences reveal 
as having the highest expected value. This ‘strategy selector’ estimates the expected value of 
control [EVC] of a given strategy by pitting its expected benefits against its expected costs. A 
strategy’s expected benefits are intuitively easy to grasp. In the marshmallow case, the 
expected benefit of control exertion is obtaining a double reward, weighted by the probability 
of actually succeeding (as determined by the agent’s past experiences). To specify the costs of 
control, these models assume that cognitive control exertion is inherently costly. This is 
supported by evidence that people are willing to forego economic reward to avoid cognitively 
effortful tasks. From this kind of aversion to control exertion researchers infer a cost of control 
(Kool et al., 2010). Accordingly, the more mental effort a given strategy requires, and the 
longer it must be implemented, the costlier it is estimated to be. Strategy selectors calculate 
EVC for all available control strategies, and select the EVC-maximizing strategy. As strategy 
implementation carries on, selectors continue to update EVC calculations according to 
feedback from monitoring systems. Thus EVC-maximizing strategies can change mid-
performance. 
 So far this description is entirely subpersonal, but the process is not meant to be. The 
feeling of mental effort [FME] is posited as “the conscious, experienced measurement of the 
costs” of control strategy implementation (Kurzban et al., 2013, p. 662)⁠; this is a personal-
level representation in that it need not but may become conscious once costs are large enough 
(Westbrook & Braver, 2015, p. 399)⁠. As an index of the costs of a given control strategy, an 
intensification of FME motivates the agent to search for alternatives to said strategy (which 
can be selecting a different strategy or no strategy at all). FME is predictive in the sense that it 
informs about the future costs of deploying a strategy. Hence FME can be used to assess 
strategies both before and during implementation.  
 FME is an action-oriented feeling. As a product of the reinforcement-learning 
systems that estimate control’s costs, FME integrates information about the agent’s current 
cognitive task; her capacities and limits; and the control strategy’s expected costs in the 
current context. Thus FME gives the agent otherwise inaccessible action-relevant information 
about strategies and their expected costs. While it is a product of subpersonal, reinforcement-
learning-based calculations, agents can use FME as input for flexible practical reasoning, to 
decide whether to maintain the current mixed-format intention or modify it at the personal 
level. 
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 If this is correct, FME is tailored for skilled action guidance in both its format—
because it presents this information as an affective experience that agents can quickly 
incorporate into flexible practical reasoning—and its content—because it represents action-
relevant information about agent, context, and strategy implementation. FME thus illustrates 
how to solve the guidance problem: agents can guide self-control exertion by selecting, 
maintaining and revising control strategies through a flexible practical reasoning that is 
possible, among other things, by input from action-oriented feelings like FME which offer 
crucial information about strategy implementation. 
3.2. Skillful guidance during self-control exertion 
Consider the marshmallow children again. In navigating a motivational situation crowded 
with temptations, they display four levels of control (Fig.2). At the most abstract level, the 
children represent the goal they have committed to: a general intention (to obtain the second 
marshmallow) perhaps formed via standard propositional practical reasoning after listening to 
the experimenter’s instructions. Faced with the challenge of waiting and the growing desire to 
immediately eat the one marshmallow, each child carries out a lower-level instance of flexible 
practical reasoning, i.e. a quick search for the right actionable means to achieve her goal in this 
context. This kind of reasoning takes as input action-oriented non-propositional states like 
mental-imagery/perception blends (e.g. imagining places in the room to hide the 
marshmallow) and affective representations like FME.  
 Skilled self-controlled agents thus use flexible practical reasoning to form, maintain 
and adapt mixed-format intentions, which represent the selected control strategy and its 
implementation parameters in specific ways that can be carried out by lower-level 
implementation and monitoring processes. These lower-level processes include directing 
attention (e.g. focusing on the goal or distracting oneself), reappraising the tempting stimuli 
(e.g. representing the marshmallow as white and cloud-like) or inhibiting certain behavior 
(e.g. refraining from extending one’s hands toward the marshmallow). While implementation 
and monitoring are subpersonal processes, they are structured by the mixed-format intention’s 
content. Conversely, these subpersonal processes generate action-oriented representations like 
FME that agents can use to guide strategy implementation via flexible practical reasoning. 
Thus agents can use all levels of control to intentionally influence self-control exertion by 




Figure 2: Hierarchical control structures in self-control exertions. 
 
 Now, just like easier and harder instances of driving require different amounts of 
agentive control, similarly with easier and harder instances of self-control exertion. 
Synchronic self-control always implies some difficulty: the automatic tendency is to follow 
temptation, so cognitive control must be recruited to counter it. But just like habitual drives 
are largely automatic for the expert driver, everyday self-control challenges will also be largely 
automatic for the skillful self-controlled agent, who will control performance at an abstract 
level and allow well-tuned automated routines to do most of the work. That said, even experts 
eventually have to face extraordinary circumstances (e.g. personal crises, extreme turns of luck) 
that test their abilities, and in those cases they will need to exert much closer agentive control 
over the situation. 
 One of the instances where flexible practical reasoning is necessary is when agents 
must switch strategies. This is an under-explored but common feature of self-control 
exertions admitting of individual variation (Ford et al., 2019)⁠. During marshmallow studies, 
children attempt strategy switches in varying degrees, and those who make more distinct 
attempts and try more diverse strategies tend to have greater success at delaying gratification 
(Carlson & Beck, 2008; Haimovitz et al., 2019)⁠. The job of agentive guidance thus continues 
while self-control exertion lasts, and often requires attempting multiple strategies in a single 
episode. 
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3.3. Supporting evidence 
If what I have said so far is right, the skill of self-control involves correctly forming and 
managing mixed-format intentions via flexible practical reasoning. This provides a crucial test 
for the account: if the abilities involved in flexible practical reasoning are characteristic of self-
controlled agents, then differences in how agents form and manage intentions should make a 
difference in their success at self-control. For example, some people might form more detailed 
intentions than others; and some people might differently represent the motivational states 
justifying their intentions. If the skill model proposed above is correct, such differences should 
be correlated with differences in self-control success. I will briefly discuss two lines of 
empirical research that corroborate this point. 
 A quite direct corroboration comes from research on implementation intentions: 
commitments to satisfy a general intention by carrying out a specific action plan in a specific 
situation (Gollwitzer, 1999)⁠. An implementation intention contains an if-then plan that 
specifies “when, where, and how the person will instigate responses that promote goal 
realization” (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006)⁠. Large bodies of work have consistently shown that 
explicitly forming implementation intentions positively affects goal attainment by strengthening 
both action initiation and perseverance in goal pursuit in the face of temptations (Ib.). Recent 
meta-analyses corroborate a robust, positive effect of implementation-intention formation on 
overcoming temptations in realms like increasing physical activity (Bélanger-Gravel et al., 
2013)⁠, quitting smoking (McWilliams et al., 2019)⁠, and adopting healthier diets (Vilà et al., 
2017). 
 Thus, agents who purposefully form a detailed mixed-format intention (a specific set 
of instructions about the steps of strategy implementation) can structure lower-level routines 
more robustly and effectively. Arguably this occurs because automatic control processes can 
monitor the implementation of detailed intentions more closely, and can thus produce clearer 
and more numerous action-oriented feelings that the agent is then able to use for guiding 
performance through flexible practical reasoning. 
 Another source of support can be found in research on motivation framing, which 
shows that when pursuing a goal, it matters not only how motivated you are, but also how you 
represent the motivations underlying your intention. Agents can be chiefly motivated to 
pursue a goal or an action by either want-to motivations (by considering the goal or action self-
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rewarding, inherently enjoyable or linked to their core values or identity) or have-to 
motivations (by linking the goal or action to extrinsic incentives like monetary pay, the 
avoidance of punishment or of negative emotions like guilt or shame) (Werner & 
Milyavskaya, 2019)⁠. Participants motivated by want-to motivations report lower levels of 
temptation to quit, and are willing to persevere in the tasks for longer periods (Koestner et al., 
2002; Milyavskaya et al., 2015). Moreover, people who construe their goals as propelled by 
want-to motivations tend to have higher trait self-control scores (Converse et al., 2019). 
 Werner and Milyavskaya (2019) suggest motivation framing affects performance by 
moderating feelings of effort: “want-to goals feel subjectively easier, even when the goal 
requires the same amount of objective effort”. Thus it seems agents who frame a self-control 
exertion as motivated by their own tastes and values (instead of framing it as an instrumental 
means for a distinct end) are able to persevere in its production for longer periods and can 
dedicate more cognitive resource to its performance. So there is initial evidence that the way 
people frame their motivations affects the way strategy selectors calculate the expected costs 
and benefits of action. This is reflected in the agents’ experiencing fewer temptations and 
lower FME levels under a want-to framing than under a have-to framing. Skillful practical 
reasoners would be able to use such framing effects to their advantage, selecting the framing 
that allows them to implement control strategies most effectively. 
 This allows for an expansion of an already-existing idea. Holton (2009, p. 123) claims 
that agents must rehearse their intentions in order to overcome temptation. Rehearsal involves 
reminding oneself of one’s intention and the reasons for having formed it—thereby 
maintaining their influence on performance—, without re-opening deliberation—since that 
would undermine the intention’s role as a commitment. Motivation-framing research suggests 
that skilled agents can do much more than rehearse: they can reframe their intentions and 
reasons, i.e. search for alternative descriptions of their relevant mental states looking for the 
ones that best trigger and sustain the intended performance. Switching motivation from a 
have-to to a want-to framing would be a specific reframing technique.  
 It could be objected that even if want-to goal framing is associated with self-control 
success, it does not show that agents intentionally engage in reframing; some might simply be 
more disposed to want-to framing than others. The evidence mentioned above does not in 
fact show that agents intentionally engage in flexible practical reasoning to alter the framing 
of their motivational states. However, research on the strategy of cognitive reappraisal 
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systematically shows that one can become better at self-control by learning to reframe diverse 
aspects of one’s situation—including one’s motivations (Gross, 2015, p. 9).  
 Evidence thus corroborates the claim that the ability to appropriately form and shape 
mixed-format intentions allows agents to exert self-control more effectively. This shows that 
the skill of self-control involves the ability to manage intentions via flexible practical 
reasoning. 
 
4. The skill model of self-control 
This section specifies ways in which the skill model furthers our understanding of self-
control. I highlight two upshots of the skill model: (4.1) the primacy of synchronic self-
control and (4.2) the prevalence of diachronic self-control.  
 
4.1. The primacy of synchronic self-control 
Mylopoulos and Pacherie [M&P] (2020)⁠ characterize self-control as a “hybrid skill”. The skill 
model developed here shares general commitments with M&P’s approach: both accounts 
present self-control as a hybrid skill (one which merges top-down, reflective processes and 
spontaneous, automatic processes), and both explain self-control exertion by specifying the 
multiple levels of control that make it possible. There are, however, crucial differences. 
M&P’s focus is on diachronic self-control (the ability to solve foreseeable motivational 
conflicts), whereas I focus here on synchronic self-control (the ability to solve current 
motivational conflicts).19 Since M&P focus on diachronic self-control, they concentrate their 
discussion of control types on strategic control: “the ability to anticipate a potential loss of 
control given the upcoming situation of action” (p.93). They argue convincingly that this kind 
of control depends crucially on (1) the agent’s knowledge of her own strengths and 
weaknesses, necessary to anticipate motivational conflicts; and (2) her tendency to think about 
 
19 Some researchers deny that diachronic strategies should be considered forms of self-control (Sripada, 
2020)⁠. I have no space here to address this point. Suffice it to say that nothing here hinges on whether 




 Following this line of thought, I take the skill model to explain how condition (1) can 
be fulfilled. Diachronic self-control must be dependent on the processes whereby the agent 
acquires regulatory self-knowledge, and the monitoring mechanisms of synchronic self-
control are a reliable source of knowledge of precisely that kind. Trained to detect conflicts 
and assess the expected costs and benefits of regulating them, these mechanisms also learn to 
associate specific situation types with expected regulatory risks, in a way that can be deployed 
preventively upon encountering the situation in the future. To go back to Tom’s story, after 
struggling with wine-related temptations a few times while getting groceries, Tom may begin 
to anticipate a potential loss of control before entering the store. This would allow him to 
exercise some strategic control of the M&P variety: he might intentionally avoid the wines 
section, or preventively promise Tim he will not buy any wine this time. 
 If this is correct, then the self-knowledge required to anticipate a potential temptation 
emerges from the accumulation of information by the automatic monitoring mechanisms 
underlying synchronic self-control exertions. Just as they output personal-level feelings of 
effort that predict the costs and benefits of control exertion, these mechanisms can also output 
action-oriented feelings of alertness or risk, emotional warnings that motivation conflicts 
might arise in a given situation. If the agent is sufficiently prone to future-oriented thinking 
(M&P’s condition (2)), these feelings will allow her to devise strategies to tackle the 
motivational conflict before it becomes too strong. 
We can then say that synchronic self-control is explanatorily prior to diachronic self-
control. This is because it will be possible for agents to begin anticipating the regulatory 
demands of familiar situations once they have acquired the monitoring capacities constitutive 
of synchronic self-control. Such capacities make it possible to anticipate motivational 
conflicts, thereby making diachronic self-control possible. 
 This suggests that action-oriented representations play two key roles in self-
regulation: first, by representing the expected costs and benefits of control strategy 
implementation, they have the proximal function of enabling the skilled guidance of 
synchronic self-control exertions via flexible practical reasoning. And by representing the 
accumulated self-knowledge about the agent’s own motivational strengths and weaknesses, 
and about which kinds of situations are likely to exploit the latter, they also have the distal 
function of making anticipatory self-regulation strategies possible. Proximally, action-oriented 
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representations contribute to the exercise of synchronic self-control (the skill of overcoming 
currently-felt strong temptations), while distally they contribute to the development and 
exercise of diachronic self-control (the skill of minimizing or avoiding foreseeable 
temptations). 
 
4.2. The prevalence of diachronic self-control 
If the self-knowledge constituted by the accumulated practice of synchronic self-control 
exertions enables the development of diachronic regulatory strategies, then skilled self-
controlled agents will have better chances to devise and deploy anticipatory strategies that 
seek to minimize or altogether avoid temptations. There is reason to expect diachronic 
strategies to be more efficient in the long run, since they minimize the effort of intense 
cognitive control usage (Duckworth et al., 2016): developing steady and strong exercise habits 
is less resource-consuming than effortfully dragging oneself to the gym every time one wants 
to work out. It is therefore likely that agents skilled at diachronic self-control will tend to 
select diachronic strategies over synchronic ones. 
 This ultimately leads to a somewhat surprising result: agents more skilled at 
synchronic self-control will tend to have more diachronic tools at their disposal; and so, since 
these tend to be less effortful, they will tend to select diachronic strategies more often than 
synchronic ones. Synchronic strategies will perhaps be necessary for unexpected or unusually 
strong motivational conflicts, but frequent motivational conflicts will tend to be avoided or 
minimized pre-emptively rather than allowed freely to initiate and then faced head-on. 
 Thus, the skill model suggests the prevalence of diachronic self-control strategies in 
skilled agents. This is in fact supported by evidence suggesting that long-term goal attainment 
is correlated, not with resisting temptation, but with feeling tempted less frequently 
(Hofmann et al., 2012; Milyavskaya & Inzlicht, 2017). Additionally, trait self-control 
measures are robustly correlated with the tendency to engage in planning (Sjåstad & 
Baumeister, 2018)⁠. It thus seems that those who excel at exerting self-control tend to rely on 
diachronic strategies more frequently than on synchronic ones. This suggests that synchronic 
self-control is a sort of self-effacing skill: the more skilled you are at it, the less often you tend 
to use it. Its crucial role seems to be to enable diachronic regulation by providing the self-
knowledge required to anticipate motivational conflicts. Beyond that, for skilled agents 
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synchronic strategies would be an emergency measure more than an everyday feature of self-
regulation. 
 To further strengthen the claim that synchronic self-control is a self-effacing skill, 
consider the relationships between self-control and habit. People who with high trait self-
control measures seem at the same time to have weaker habits for unhealthy activities 
(Adriaanse et al., 2014), and to be able to develop more robust commitment-consistent habits 
(Galla & Duckworth, 2015). This further supports the view that skilled agents, instead of 
relying on their advanced synchronic strategies, tend instead to use diachronic ones (like 
planning and situation selection) to form and manage habits, which, once established, largely 
automate self-regulation and eliminate the need for synchronic self-control (Carden & Wood, 
2018).  
 This shows how, although synchronic self-control is explanatorily prior, diachronic 
self-control is prevalent in practice for skilled agents. It also highlights a remarkable contrast 
between self-control and other forms of skill: the more skilled an agent is at synchronic self-
control, the less she will tend to use the synchronic strategies that constitute that skill. This is 
unlike standard cases of skills (like driving or playing basketball), in which the agent 
continuously refines and structures action representations, motor schemas, and internal 
models of the same action domain as she improves her skill. In the case of self-control, when 
agents have sufficiently developed their synchronic skill, they tend to replace it with a 
diachronic one.20 
 It makes sense that this is so. After all, self-control is arguably a purely instrumental 
skill: we use it merely to disable temptations that threaten to undermine the consistency 
between our commitments and our actions, so we exert self-control only to the extent that we 
need to avoid motivational obstacles. Thus, if there are no motivational obstacles, there is no 
need for self-control. In fact, the less self-control we need to exert the better, since 
minimizing it would liberate cognitive resources to pursue commitments and goals that we 
value non-instrumentally. So, while it is better to exert synchronic self-control than to give in 
to an active temptation, it is better still to exert diachronic self-control than to exert 
synchronic self-control (insofar as the former is more resource-efficient than the latter); and 
 
20 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify the contrast between self-control and other 
skills.  
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even better to be able to rely on habits for self-regulation (for the same reason). It is therefore 
rational for synchronic self-control to be self-effacing: doing so frees us to focus on what we 
actually care about. 
 
Conclusion  
This paper began with the challenge of constructing an account of self-control capable of 
fulfilling the skillful agency requirement and tackling the guidance problem. The resulting 
skill model holds that self-control involves the ability to engage in flexible practical reasoning 
to manage mixed-format intentions as the self-control exertion unfolds. Evidence of the 
effects of implementation intentions and motivation framing on self-control success 
corroborates that mastering our temptations requires mastering the flexible practical 
deliberation that structures and threads together cognitive-control processes as they unfold. 
 The skill model developed here fills a key gap in self-control research. Many agree that 
self-control exertions are skilled actions, but no account of such skilled agency was previously 
available, particularly for cases of synchronic self-control. The skill model specifies how such 
skilled action unfolds. I have additionally shown that, while synchronic self-control has 
developmental primacy, diachronic forms of regulation have more prevalence as skill increases, 
and that self-control is thus a self-effacing skill. This helps to harmonize the apparently 
conflicting claims that self-control depends on cognitive control, and that those who succeed 
most at exerting self-control rely more on automaticity and habit than on cognitive control.  
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